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representatives, researchers, passing journalists, and other city personalities, the former Ugandan minister and mediator for the latest peace talks Betty Bigombe, Colonel Charles Otema, head of military intelligence for North Uganda and owner of the hotel, several Acholi dignitaries and Brigadier K., former LRA emissary, all sat at the same table. K. quickly walked away from our table after having greeted us. He had just politely declined my request for an interview: "I may accept . . . If I want to . . . ," he quipped with a smile, without my being able to tell whether it was provocation on the part of a commander raised a few months prior to the status of "VIP" or cautious detachment from the game of questions and answers with which he had little familiarity and that could have compromised his safety and recently acquired status.
Since they had come out of the bush, several of the former LRA commanders had joined the quarters of the Ugandan army's Fourth Division. Others lived at the hotel at the government's expense. They had become the government's ostentatious guests in the small city's luxury residence. The scene would have been unthinkable two years before. The LRA was known for its forced conscription of child-soldiers and its attacks against civilians-the very same people with whom it was now supposed to cohabit. But especially, the government and the army hardliners who were staunch partisans of a military option since the conf lict began in 1987, refused at the time to engage in talks with the "remaining elements" of a group of "criminals," "bandits," and "thugs." Seizing an opportunity to align itself with US policy, Kampala had managed to get the LRA placed on the state department list of terrorist organizations in December 2001. The disconcerting microcosm of the Acholi Inn was revealing of several major changes at once in the course of the war, in the range of scenarios envisioned to exit it and in the treatment granted to former LRA combatants. Their demobilization raised military, legal, and political challenges. How would the government handle the reintegration of the most senior LRA commanders in a context where several hundred, maybe even thousands, of LRA combatants were still in the bush?
2 Under pressure from associations of parents of abducted children, religious and human rights organizations, and local officials, the government passed an amnesty law in 2000 that was to facilitate the defection of combatants and the return of children abducted by the rebels. But was it also applicable to those who bore criminal responsibility for the atrocities and war crimes committed? And what role would former combatants and their leaders play during the referendum campaign on the return of multipartism, the 2006 presidential election, and the future transition to peace? Did the government have reason to fear political radicalization in the northern region through a convergence of the political opposition and the former military opposition?
This chapter sets out to demonstrate that through the differential treatment received by certain senior commanders for their reintegration, the government was working in part to restore security in the north. But it
